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Abstract 
 
Cambodia’s history of colonialism and an infamous communist regime has left the country 
with a legacy of corruption, weak rule of law and a lack of tenure security. The concept of 
land grabbing is becoming more and more frequent, while at the same time receiving a great 
deal of attention from NGOs and the international community. In a country where the idea of 
ownership is relatively new, most of the country is still untitled. With no land title, it is 
difficult to prove ownership of the property. This is taken advantage of by the government, 
who is selling, leasing and concessioning already occupied property to dubious corporations.  
 
In 2001, a new land law was adopted that, in theory, offers protection not only to titleholders, 
but also to occupants of land. In practice however, this protection is very weak. Though the 
progressive law was drafted with the help of the international donor community, the 
implementation of this law has not been successful. The law is systematically circumvented 
by the government when divesting of land to companies, owned by influential businessmen 
with close ties to the ruling party. In order to avoid bad media coverage and pressure from 
NGOs, the companies hide behind several shell companies. This further clouds the already 
limited transparency process. There are appeal mechanisms set in place, but corruption and 
lack of an independent court system deny the individual of any real possibility of making his 
case heard. This is aggravated by the lack of knowledge and resources within the court 
system. As the court stands under the influence of the state, judges dare neither hear land 
grabbing cases nor rule in the favor of the complainant. As such, the cases are simply rejected.  
 
The problem of land grabbing is exacerbated by the blurry line between state public property 
and state private property on one hand, and private property on the other. With the support of 
the World Bank, an ambitious land titling project was initiated. Because of differences 
between the Cambodian government and the WB, the project was later canceled. This has left 
the land titling process in the hands of the government and is now proceeding ahead very 
slowly. The first step towards strengthening tenure security is to resurrect the project of the 
WB, in order to accelerate the process of land titling and thus prevent future land grabbings. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Cambodia, a country with a dark history of civil war and the crimes of humanity that 
followed, inescapably evokes images of Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge regime. More than 30 
years later, the acts of the regime still echo into Cambodia’s present, through the belated 
reconciliation process of the ECCC. However, the legacy of the Khmer Rouge far exceeds the 
pain of the genocide survivors. The regime’s annihilation of private property rights and the 
legal system in its entirety, still affects Cambodia to this day. Lack of tenure security and a 
well-functioning legal system is one of Cambodia’s greatest impediments to economic and 
social development. And though there are attempts being made by the international donor 
community to aid the government in strengthening the institutions in charge, from where the 
Cambodian people are standing today, the light at the end of the tunnel seems very, very far 
away. 
 
In the past few years, land disputes have escalated in Cambodia. Most of the Swedish aid 
granted to Cambodia is directed towards preventing so-called “land grabbing,” i.e. the 
acquisition of land, which is already occupied or owned by someone. As a result, the 
individuals occupying the land are evicted. As the these practices are clouded in secrecy, 
statistics on how much land has been transferred to private interests through sales, leases and 
concessions, are difficult to find. However, the media and NGOs claim that forced evictions 
point to at least 45 per cent of the country’s land being alienated1 from the state over the past 
15 years.
2
 In Cambodia, this has had a vast impact on its population through forced evictions 
and slow development. 
 
About 80 percent of Cambodia’s population lives in rural areas. Most of them are self-
sufficient and dependent on rice and livestock for their livelihood.
3
 In these rural areas, 
concessions are being granted for agricultural purposes, e.g. for sugar or cassava plantations, 
logging or mining, while at the same removing the farmers from their means of support. In 
many cases, the communities do not find out that the land has been divested of until after the 
fact and their access to land has been cut off. 
 
                                                          
1
 Through concessions (ELCs, but also logging and mining concessions), leases and sales. 
2
 See for example Global Witness. Country for Sale, p.5 or Levy. A and Scott-Clark, C. Country for Sale 
3
 World Bank. Rural Development & Agriculture in Cambodia. 
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In Cambodia at least, this is not only a rural problem. Land grabbing is also very common in 
the capital of Phnom Penh, where land is sold to private investors for so-called development 
projects. In reality, these development projects include everything from the erection of high-
rise buildings to beautification projects
4
. In the past few years, there has also been a high 
frequency of speculation in urban property, causing prices to skyrocket. 
 
An individual’s access to property rights is considered an essential part of the fundamental 
rights, codified in various international agreements, notably in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. The right to property is there listed as a basic human right, and it is further 
stated that no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of this property.
5
 Moreover, it has been argued 
that through international treaties property rights of individuals have even been rendered more 
sacred than even the sovereign rights of states.
6
 Nevertheless, land grabbing is just as frequent 
as ever. 
 
1.1 Purpose of Study 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to describe and analyze how the Cambodian legal system is 
allowing extralegal land acquisitions. The intention beforehand was to examine what national 
effects so-called land grabbing had on Cambodia as a whole, concerning rice production, food 
shortages and poverty. After spending a few weeks in Cambodia, it was clear however that the 
current debate on food shortages and rice production was quite oxymoronic. On one hand, 
there seemed to be a consensus among the NGOs that land grabbing indeed causes food 
shortages and reduces rice production; on the other hand, there seemed to be no real indicator 
of, or research on this.
7
 Meanwhile, newspapers were reporting that prime minister Hun Sen 
                                                          
4
 So called beatification projects is an umbrella word for example the creation of city parks or erection of 
monuments. 
5
 UDHR, Art. 17 
6
 De Soto, H. The mystery of Capital – Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else, p. 166 
7
 However, during the past few years rice prices in Cambodia have soared. Rice is the most common food in 
Cambodia where it amounts to 50 percent of the total food consumption in poor families. As such, increase of 
the price of rice will lead to increased poverty especially among the already poor. This is exacerbated by the 
fact that Cambodian farmers lack “proper milling infrastructure” as well as stocking facilities. For that reason 
the rice is exported to Thailand to be milled and stored and then imported back to a much higher price. See UN 
country team discussion paper on rising food prices, 
http://www.un.org.kh/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=103:rising-food-prices-discussion-
paper-&catid=46:rising-food-prices and FAO Initiative on Soaring Food Prices – Cambodia, 
http://www.fao.org/isfp/country-information/cambodia/en/. 
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announced a goal of rising rice export levels to one million tons by 2015.
8
 The foci of the 
NGO’s work and research in Cambodia laid instead on the human rights violations that 
usually follow the land grabbings. As such, the focus of this paper quickly became another. 
This thesis will instead treat how the legal system allows these land grabbings, both through 
legislation, through its implementation and through process of appeal in the court systems. 
The thesis will attempt to answer the following questions: 
 
1) How is the 2001 Land Law circumvented by the government when divesting of already 
occupied land? 
 
2) What theoretical and real possibilities does an individual have of having his case heard and 
fairly tried in the Cambodian court system? 
 
3) What should the international community do to aid in strengthening the rule of law and 
tenure security in Cambodia? 
 
1.2 Method and Material 
 
This thesis is mainly based on material collected during the course of a Minor Field Study 
conducted in Cambodia between September 6
 
and November 8, 2010. The purpose of 
traveling to Cambodia was to gather information and material through interviews and 
observations.  
 
The field study was composed of in-depth interviews with employees at both national and 
international NGOs, researchers, lawyers and law professors as well as informal conversations 
with various individuals. The interviews were semi-structured, allowing for flexibility, not 
knowing exactly where the interviews would lead and what information would surface, as the 
land issue is highly delicate. Moreover, in some cases, the interviews corrected some 
preconceived misconceptions, and it was thus necessary to be adaptable. Due to what, in some 
cases, may be considered sensitive information; all the interviewees have been anonymized.  
 
                                                          
8
 See Bopha, P. & Vrieze, P. Rice Export Goal Not Easy, Hun Sen Warns. 
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These interviewees also provided additional written information, such as dissertations, 
publications, and reports. Newspaper articles were also valuable sources in following the day-
to-day updates on recent land grabbing disputes as well as the development of Boeung Kak 
and Koh Pich. Apart from the material gathered in Cambodia, books on Cambodia’s history 
as well as publications, reports and statistics from various NGOs have been used. It goes 
without saying that Cambodian laws and sub-decrees have been requisite for this thesis. In 
order to consult individuals who had been affected firsthand by land grabbings, a community 
meeting in Phnom Penh was also attended. The purpose of the community meeting was to 
agree on an alternative strategy to present to the Cambodian government, so that their land 
will be preserved. Observing this and speaking to these individuals in person was invaluable. 
 
Spending roughly two months in Cambodia reading newspapers and having informal 
conversations with locals allowed me to get a sense of the general atmosphere in the country. 
Traveling around the countryside and down to the coastal towns, thus stepping out of the 
expat bubble in Phnom Penh, also helped in understanding how acute the land grabbing 
problem is. One need not travel far from the city center to experience the urban slums to 
which the evictees are forced.  
 
In order to illustrate how acquisitions are made in reality, case studies have also been 
included. These case studies are all high-profile cases and in many ways, they follow the 
common recipe for extralegal land acquisition. Moreover, these places were visited firsthand 
during the field study, making the inclusion of them all the more relevant in the author’s eyes. 
 
1.3 Delimitations 
 
Human Rights violations are almost always mentioned in the wake of land grabbings. As 
countless sources and recollections of undisputed human rights violations already exist, this is 
only included as a parenthesis in certain sections.  
 
Moreover, the concept of collective ownership is described, but not treated further in this 
thesis. Mainly because this area is so complex, that it would have to be dealt with separately. 
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1.4 Disposition 
 
The introductory chapter introduces the reader to the current situation on property issues in 
Cambodia. To put individual ownership in a historical context, this is followed by a brief 
history of Cambodia with a primary focus on the evolution of property rights, from the 
Angkorean period up until today, including the Khmer Rouge’s annihilation of the legal 
system. Chapter three describes the former land laws leading up to the current one. The 
articles governing possession and ownership, both private and state, are described, as well as 
the articles and sub-decrees governing the leasing out and sale of state property. To obtain a 
clearer picture of how land acquisitions are made in practice, several high profile cases studies 
are offered. As part of the problem of land grabbing has its root in people lacking titles of 
ownership for their property, the land titling system in Cambodia is explained in chapter four. 
To fully comprehend the corruption within the government and legal system, a brief history of 
Cambodia’s patronage system, which permeates the society in its entirety, is also provided. It 
is true that corruption within the government structure has a high prevalence in many post-
conflict countries. However, the patronage system of Cambodia is unique in many ways and it 
will be argued in this thesis that if perhaps not the current corruption per se is deeply rooted in 
its culture, the importance of doing the right person favors in order to gain protection very 
much is. An analysis of how this influences the court rulings and proper implementation of 
the 2001 Land Law is offered in chapter eight. Thereafter follows a chapter on possible future 
consequences of land grabbing. Lastly, a conclusion and analysis is provided in the final 
chapter. 
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2. A History of Cambodia  
 
A large part of this thesis includes a history of Cambodia, with a focus on the establishment of 
property rights, the legal system, and patronage politics, as well as the subsequent destruction 
of the same property rights and legal system. This is of great significance as Cambodia’s 
history very much echoes into the present day in the form of lack of ownership titles and lack 
of a functioning legal system. Therefore, the current events in Cambodia must be understood 
in light of its history and its peoples’ relation to land. 
 
2.1 Angkor – The Founding of Cambodian Agriculture 
 
The kingdom of Cambodia evokes a sense of mystery. With ancient temples and Buddhist 
wats dispersed throughout the country, the mystery of the lost ages remains very much today. 
Driving through the Cambodian countryside, there is a certain sense of timelessness that 
strikes you, making you believe for a second that you have found yourself in 10
th
 century 
Angkor or in 19
th
 century Indochina. The farmers in the rice fields are wearing the same 
clothes and using the same farming tools that they have used for centuries. Some claim that 
there exists a certain conservatism and pride of heritage, remaining since the Angkorean 
period, in keeping the status quo. 
 
There is some debate surrounding the timeline of the Angkorean period. As the years 802 and 
1431 are commonly used and as Chandler that these dates mark Cambodia’s period of 
greatness these dates will be used in this paper.
9
  
 
The first step towards a Cambodian agricultural system arrived with king Indravarman. The 
king was the first to supply Angkor with an irrigation system in the form of a large reservoir 
to trap rainwater.
10
 Following this, the succeeding kings of Angkor continued to develop the 
area by erecting temples and monuments as well as continuing to develop the reservoir 
system. In the beginning of the 11th century, King Suryavarman took over the monarchy and 
commissioned the Angkor Wat temple. At this time, the system of reservoirs and canals that 
had been built provided the basis for Angkor’s agriculture, which consisted mainly of rice 
                                                          
9
 Chandler, D. History of Cambodia, p. 35 
10
 Ibid., p. 42 
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farming. In this way, the state of Angkor could start to build the foundations of a functioning 
economy.
11
 
 
This irrigation system spread to other newly established cities in the area. Rice had come to 
form the basis of the Angkorean economy and surpluses were collected for the benefit of the 
state. There was even a tax system, which taxed everything from rice, salt to wax and honey.
12
 
During the Angkorean period, all land belonged to the Cambodian king but was free to be 
cultivated by the people in whichever way they see fit.  
 
Without trying to further fuel the myth about Cambodian rural conservatism, an interesting 
fact in understanding the inertia of the Cambodian agriculture is the following. An average 
size of a rice-growing village in 1960s amounted to about 200 people, which is the same as it 
was during Jayavarman VII’s rule in the 12th century.13 Eventually, the products mentioned 
above would come to form exports. These exports would remain the same well into the 20
th
 
century.
14
 The inertia of Cambodia’s rural society is also confirmed by Biddulph, noting 
however than the situation has been rapidly changing during the last two decades. Rural 
households and farmers are now quickly modernizing their ways of harvesting rice through 
milling machines and tractors wheels in place of wooden wheels for their oxcarts.
15
 
 
By the 13
th
 century, it was reported that as much as three or four harvests of rice a year were 
possible in the Angkor state thanks to the favorable conditions mentioned above as well as the 
close proximity to the Tonle Sap Lake. These statistics would later be used in propaganda by 
the Khmer Rouge.
16
 
 
Without workers, the Angkorean kings would by no means have been able to develop the 
advanced society that they had. To obtain this manpower, a slave system developed. It is 
believed that slaves were taken from mountain tribes as captives and that the Cambodian 
society could only build itself up through socializing what they deemed were barbarians.
17
 As 
                                                          
11
 Ibid., p. 63 
12
 Ibid., p. 64 
13
 Ibid., p.76 
14
 Ibid., p. 87 
15
 Biddulph, R. Geographies of Evasion – The Development Industry and Property Rights Interventions in Early 
21
st
 Century Cambodia, p. 74 
16
 Chandler, D. A History of Cambodia, p. 86 
17
 Ibid., p. 85 
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a slave system was established, this naturally developed a Khmer elite, who were awarded 
certain privileges. Possibly, this was a first indication of the patronage system that would 
come to evolve. 
 
In the 16
th
 century, Angkor would slowly come to deteriorate and the nation’s center would 
come to shift from Angkor to Cambodia’s current capital Phnom Penh.18 It is likely that 
Phnom Penh was chosen as the new capital to function as a trading center, much because of 
its geographical position. The foreign influences would come to grow through trade, 
especially those of the Vietnamese and Thai, and later even Europeans. Phnom Penh was now 
the home to many foreign traders working closely with Khmer officials. It is implied by 
Chandler that these foreign mercantiles somehow took the place of the slave-owning 
middleclass. Not much is mentioned about the rice farmers, but the previously mentioned elite 
would continue to flourish mainly thanks to the trade.
19
 For an understanding of Cambodian 
ownership history, it is interesting to note that material inheritance at the time was 
nonexistent. When the owner of a house passed away, his possessions were returned to the 
king; this included land as well as ranks and positions in society.
20
 In the 17
th
 century, 
Cambodia was still a relatively independent society, which would come to change during the 
next two centuries.  
 
2.2 The French Connection 
 
The 19
th
 century would be defined by the rivalry between the large kingdoms of Siam
21
  and 
Vietnam and Cambodia was repeatedly occupied by the two countries’ forces.22 These 
invasions of Cambodia would come to weaken the country politically. The Cambodian elite 
persisted however, supported by rice farmers. This was a conservative and hierarchical 
society with a “great emphasis on rank and privilege.”23 
 
In 1863, king Norodom concluded a treaty of provisions with France, accepting all 
“administrative, judicial, financial, and commercial reforms which the French government 
                                                          
18
 Ibid., pp. 92-93 
19
 Ibid., pp. 104-105 
20
 Ibid., pp. 94-98 
21
 What we today know as Thailand 
22
 Chandler, op. cit., p 141 
23
 Ibid., pp. 111-112 
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shall judge, in future, useful to make their protectorate successful.”24 This would be the 
beginning of Cambodia as a French protectorate. Notably, the French would to some extent, 
i.e. in the rice growing areas that were more populated than others, introduce the system of 
formal private property rights. This treaty would place French residents in provincial cities, 
abolish slavery, and institutionalize the ownership of land, something that very much enraged 
the Cambodian elite. Abolishment of slavery would imply the end of the patronage system 
and cutting the ties between masters and servants. Rebellion broke out as “the masters wanted 
to keep their slaves and the slaves their masters.”25 French control would come to grow even 
more and by 1892, they even managed the collection of direct taxation. In the meantime, royal 
decrees allowing French citizens to purchase land had produced a real estate boom in Phnom 
Penh.
26
 
 
At this time, Cambodia was very much a rural society with only 2.5 percent of the people 
living in the capital.
27
 The rice farmers were nearly all ethnic Khmer, while ethnic minorities, 
such as the Chinese, occupied themselves with trade. It should be said that Cambodia was 
very poor at this time and the rice surpluses that were present during the days of Angkor 
existed no more. People grew rice to sustain themselves and last them through the day, and 
most of their time was spent growing rice. As the landholdings were small and irrigation 
works almost nonexistent, yields were consequently low.
28
 Government control lacked and 
instead the villages chose their own rulers, usually elderly men. The people’s relationship 
with the state was irregular and hostile; disputes were not settled by law but by conciliation.
29
  
 
2.3 The End of the French Rule 
 
The years following 1945 would be characterized by Cambodia’s fight for independence and 
the end of the French rule in Cambodia. In 1953, on a trip to Paris, Sihanouk was finally 
successful in negotiating a deal with France and was granted authority over Cambodia’s 
armed forces, judiciary, and foreign affairs. Now the money went directly into the pockets of 
a Cambodian elite, sitting in a government overseen by no one.  
                                                          
24
 Ibid., p 176 
25
 Ibid., p 177 
26
 Ibid., p 181 
27
 Ibid., p. 120 
28
 Ibid., p. 121 
29
 Ibid., p. 125 
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After the gaining of Independence in 1953, several political parties emerged on the scene 
attempting to take power from the king. To Sihanouk, who saw himself as the “father of 
Cambodian independence,”30 and he himself wanting to lead the country into the future, this 
came as a surprise. This led to Sihanouk’s abdication from the throne, in favor of his father, 
and him starting his own political party so that to participate in the upcoming elections. With 
his party winning the elections, Sihanouk now monopolized political power in Cambodia up 
until the 70’s.31 The Cambodian economy would begin to falter, as Sihanouk had 
continuously been ignoring Cambodia’s agricultural problems of low yields, poor irrigation, 
and huge interests on loans to farmers. These factors would come to weaken Sihanouk’s 
support and his interest in governing the country declined.  
 
On March 17, 1970 the then prime minister of Cambodia, Lon Nol, was forced to sign a 
declaration, supporting a vote against Sihanouk in the National Assembly to remove him as 
chief of state.
32
 After Sihanouk’s removal from office, Lon Nol remained Prime Minister. By 
this time, the Vietnam War was in full bloom and the unrest in neighboring country was 
continuingly flowing over into Cambodia, through the presence of North Vietnamese forces. 
In May 1970, the U.S., in alliance with South Vietnam, invaded Cambodia to drive the North 
Vietnamese forces out of the country. Lon Nol’s rule, supported by the U.S. Government, was 
already unstable and had been growing weaker during the years leading up to the revolution.
33
 
At the same time, the leftist movement in Cambodia was growing stronger; by 1970, the 
Communist Party of Kampuchea, through armed forces, occupied a fifth of Cambodia’s 
territory. In order to delay a Communist victory, the U.S. conducted a bombing campaign on 
the Cambodian countryside that reached its peak in 1973, bringing about a widespread loss of 
property and civilian casualties. The fact that Lon Nol’s air force was also dropping bombs 
would further weaken the support for his Government.
34
 These bombings would come to 
enrage the Cambodian people and increase the support of the Khmer Rouge among the Khmer 
peasantry. This encouraged many to join the Khmer Rouge or to at least give support to the 
movement.
35
 As Sihanouk had now allied with the revolutionary KR, it has been argued that 
                                                          
30
 Ibid., p. 230 
31
 For more on Cambodia gaining independence, see Chandler, pp.  211-232 
32
 Chandler, op. cit., pp.249-250 
33
 Ibid., pp. 251-252 
34
 Vickery, M. Kampuchea – Politics, Economics and Society, p. 20 
35
 Kiernan, B. How Pol Pot Came to Power,  p. 351 
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perhaps many people in Cambodia saw this as a way of restoring Sihanouk’s rule. Although 
communism had been considered foreign among the Khmer people,
36
 the Khmer Rouge had 
now gained wide popular support. 
 
2.4 The Khmer Rouge  
 
On April 17, 1975, the Khmer Rouge, led by Pol Pot, took control over Phnom Penh. This 
would be a new beginning for Cambodia, or Year Zero as the KR would come to call it. The 
country was renamed Democratic Kampuchea and the new regime would, during the 
following three years, be completely isolated from the outside world.
37
 This capture of 
Cambodia would come to last until January 7, 1979 when the CPK
38
 sponsored revolution 
ended. The purpose of the revolution was to reinstate social justice in Cambodia, which they 
thought had been lacking since the Angkorean period. What the country needed was a 
transformation to put the citizens in control of their country. This could only be possible 
through the abolishment of money, free market, formal education, religion, books, freedom of 
expression and movement, and what is most relevant to this thesis; private property. All land 
was collectivized and land records destroyed, including cadastral maps and titles. The court 
system was completely abandoned. All of the above were viewed as impediments to the 
transformation of the state. Consequently, individual property was abolished and a 
collectivization of Cambodian property was introduced. 
 
The first priority of the KR was to transform Cambodian agriculture and increase the national 
production of rice for exports. These earnings would then pay for any needed imports and 
eventually finance industrialization. To achieve this, approximately two million Cambodians 
were evacuated from Phnom Penh and sent to the countryside to work in the fields. This 
included the elderly, the sick and even small children. The conditions for the people sent out 
in to the fields were harsh. Many of the people sent out were not accustomed to the harsh 
form of physical labor that they were forced to undertake for long hours. The KR had a vision 
of ever-increasing levels of rice production, without any research into what levels of rice 
crops realistically could be expected. 
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The occupation of the KR also brought about the end of the Cambodian elite. During the four 
years of the KR’s power, approximately two million people died in the pursuit of an 
egalitarian, agricultural society. The people were forced to work long hours and without 
enough food to satisfy their basic needs, people died simply of starvation and mistreatment. 
Rice surpluses were either exported or went to feed the army rather than the hungry workers. 
In order to achieve the surplus goal, it was necessary to feed the workers less and less.
39
 
 
As Angkor once had been founded upon the control of water so would DK be. The KR had a 
vision of constructing a similar irrigation system to the one in Angkor, creating canals and 
dams in order to prevent flooding as well as allocating water during the year. This would 
increase rice production and produce rice on a year-round basis, which would provide DK 
with everything it needed from energy to steel.
40
 So one might ask what the great reward for 
the hard workers in the field was. A better quality of life? A better Cambodia? No, there was a 
simple promise that by 1980 everyone would enjoy a daily dessert.
41
  
 
People did not merely die of exhaustion in the fields. Ongoing crimes of humanity, in the 
form of torture and executions, were systematically carried out in the capital. The main targets 
of the KR were anyone with connections to the former government as well as professionals 
and intellectuals, i.e. everyone with an education or even people simply wearing eyeglasses, 
as this signified literacy. Needless to say lawyers, judges and jurists were a main target. 
Ethnic and religious minorities were also targeted, as well as Buddhist monks, seeing as 
religion had been abolished. Others were proclaimed enemies of the revolution and killed 
simply because of this, in many cases without any actual proof that this was de facto the case. 
This hostility was especially directed at the Cambodian elite and certain middle class working 
groups, such as teachers. As the Khmer Rouge regime began to falter, they became more and 
more desperate to eliminate any enemy of the revolution and anything that could hinder its 
progress. People suspected of opposing the revolution were taken to the Tuol Sleng prison, 
also known as S-21, and were there tortured and forced to mention other people they knew in 
opposition of the regime. To be considered a suspect you simply had to be mentioned in three 
other “confessions.” Charges, that in a vast majority of cases were unfounded, were brought 
against people who had been mentioned in interrogations by at least three other people. Once 
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questioned, you were considered guilty, and after the torture sessions brought to the Killing 
Fields to be executed. As such, the executions that took place were mainly political. 
 
In order to create a strict egalitarian society, the KR was forced to break down the deeply 
rooted patronage system. This made urban and rural elites more susceptible to the resentment 
of the KR. The Khmer language had a system of defining people after their rank and social 
status in the community, as well as certain ways of greeting each other. For example, the 
higher status a person has, the higher a person folds his hands in salutation.
42
 This was 
abolished all together and people were encouraged to call each other friend. It is perhaps 
therefore all the more remarkable, but not surprising perhaps, that the KR would follow in the 
steps of the old elite, by placing only their family and friends in high positions regardless of 
their actual competence within the area.
43
  
2.5 The end of Democratic Kampuchea 
 
When the DK regime ended in 1979, it was through a Vietnamese invasion. The Vietnamese 
would subsequently also help the country to establish the People’s Republic of Kampuchea. 
Perhaps not a fairytale ending to the DK regime, but still the Vietnamese were welcomed as it 
implied a de facto end of the DK. The current prime minister of Cambodia, Hun Sen became 
prime minister as early as 1985.  
 
On a positive note, many of the institutions shut down by the DK, such as religion, education, 
and family farming were now being revived.
44
 With regards to society, while the cities were 
relatively untouched, the rural society was deeply damaged. The villages had either been 
abandoned or completely torn down and people were left with no tools or means to farm the 
land. To get the rice farming back on track, the Vietnamese created so called solidarity 
groups, consisting of several families, to cultivate the land. Private ownership however was 
still not recognized and all land belonged to the state.
45
 At the time, land was in plenty and 
Cambodians took over property and houses “on an ad hoc and unregulated basis.” In the void 
of property rights, informal occupations rights evolved and became transferable.
46
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The remaining elite, i.e. those who were not killed during the DK era, did not trust the PRK. 
The majority chose not to remain in Cambodia and instead fled to Thailand, meaning that 
Cambodia then and there lost the very last of its educated people.
47
 When the DK fell in 1979, 
only ten qualified lawyers remained in Cambodia.
48
 
 
At the end of the 1980s, the Cambodian government introduced several reforms that were 
welcomed. Notably, new laws were passed allowing farmers to pass land titles to their 
children, as well as allowing people to buy and sell real estate. Collectivism was now 
officially dead. This would lead to a real estate boom in Phnom Penh, with people making 
money off speculation and restoration of property. Unfortunately, this would come to produce 
yet another Cambodian elite, which remains very much today, driving expensive cars, owning 
enormous villas and displaying obnoxious behavior.
49
  
 
2.6 After the Khmer Rouge 
 
In October 1991, the Paris Peace agreements were signed to create the United Nations 
Transitional Authority in Cambodia (1992-1994). This was carried out in agreement with the 
current Cambodian government with the aim of restoring peace and civil government in the 
country. The purpose of the UNTAC was to end the foreign military assistance and oversee 
the withdrawal of foreign forces as well as disarm the armed forces of the Cambodian parties, 
perhaps more specifically the Khmer Rouge. The United Nations wanted to get Cambodia 
back on its feet without, as it now was, depending fully on outside control. The UNTAC 
would rebuild the government and ensure that human rights and fair and free elections were 
held. With a high voting participation, the elections that followed were declared fair and a 
new coalition government was inaugurated in 1993.
50
 However, the elections were 
controversial as the CPP, with Hun Sen at the helm, did not want to accept that they had lost 
the vote and forced their way into the government.
51
 What ensued was a partial peace 
resulting in an “intensification of forest exploitation” by the army and the political elite.52 
Cambodia was now working its way to a market economy, but there existed no transparency 
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and the gaps between the elite and the rest of the Cambodian people were further widened. In 
hindsight, the consensus is that the mission was unsuccessful, slow, and inefficient. 
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3. The Cambodian Land Laws 
 
To fully understand the current 2001 Land Law, one must have an understanding of preceding 
legislation. Therefore, a brief description of previous property legislation follows below. 
 
3.1 The Reintroduction of Private Property 
 
As previously stated, the Khmer Rouge had abolished private property in 1975. This ban 
lasted 14 years and was overturned as late as 1989. At that time, the land rights were based on 
post-1979 possession, so to avoid ownership claims from refugees and Cambodian 
expatriates.
53
 As such, property rights existing before 1979 were not recognized.
54  
In reality, 
it would also have been very difficult to prove land ownership stemming from before 1979, as 
all records of title had been destroyed during the DK era. However, this entailed that the 
360 000 Cambodians living in exile since the occupation and beyond, lost all their rights to 
claiming property. According to Hun Sen, Cambodia should start again. Fortunately, for the 
Cambodian elite this included awarding prime real estate to his clique.
55
 This was also the 
beginning of privatization of industries, which had previously been state enterprises. These 
companies were simply taken over by state representatives.
56
 
 
3.2 The 2001 Land Law 
 
In 1993, a new coalition government was elected, which was succeeded by the drafting of a 
new constitution, giving full rights of ownership to Cambodian citizens. The new constitution 
codified rights that had previously been neglected during the era of the Khmer Rouge 
atrocities. After decades of instability, the new constitution now promised the Khmer citizens 
a comprehensive protection of fundamental human rights.
57
 With the disintegration of the 
entire legal system, guaranteeing the rule of law and a fair judiciary in the constitution was 
essential in order to protect civil and political liberties that had previously been suppressed.
58
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Remarkably, the Cambodian constitution is viewed by some as being one of the most liberal 
in Asia.
59
 
 
As a result, the current land law was created to fill the legal void and harmonize the law with 
the 1993 constitution. One could now register any land holding, regardless of type or size. 
The previous land laws had limited land ownership to 2000 square meters and possession to 
five hectares, restricted to agricultural land. At the time, possession and ownership differed in 
that to maintain possession over land the possessor must keep maintaining it. Land that was 
left vacant for more than three years reverted to state ownership.
60
 The 2001 Land Law 
converts legal possession recognized by previous law to ownership rights, as the new law 
considers full ownership rights also for agricultural land.  
 
The 2001 Land Law is considered a very thorough and progressive law, recognizing that 
people may be owners of a piece of property even though they lack the official papers to 
prove it. The problem is not with the law, but with its implementation or rather lack of it. The 
2001 Land Law also introduced a cadastral system, a central system of land titles.
61
 
 
3.2.1 Immovable Property 
 
In the 2001 Land Law, land is referred to as immovable property, defined as follows: 
 
- Immovable property by nature, e.g. forest land, cleared land, cultivated land and land 
submerged by waters 
 
- Immovable property by purpose, e.g. items that are fixed to the ground and cannot be 
separated from it without damage 
 
- Immovable property by law, i.e. what is defined as immovable property by law
62
 
 
                                                          
59
 Öjendal, J. & Lilja, M. Beyond Democracy in Cambodia, Political Reconstruction in a Post-Conflict Society, p. 21 
60
 Interviewee no. 2 
61
 Ibid. 
62
 2001 Land Law, Art. 2 
24 
 
3.2.2 Possession 
 
The purpose of the new law was to remedy the problems of the old one, and in particular to 
put an end to any new possession. In order to claim legal possession of property one now has 
to meet the following five conditions for the possession to be considered legal.   
 
1) First, occupation of the property must be unambiguous, i.e. the person claiming 
ownership must be the exclusive possessor of the land and acting for himself.   
2) Moreover, the occupation of the land must be non-violent and the acquisition of 
this land must have been peacefully acquired.  
3) In addition, the individual seeking ownership must occupy the land notoriously to 
the public so that it is possible for others to contest his or her rights.  
4) The possessor must thereto have occupied the land continuously, with only few 
interruptions for short periods of time allowed.   
5) Last, the possessor must occupy the land in good faith.63  
 
It should be made clear that legal possession is a right per se and does not constitute 
ownership of the land. Possession of property entails the right to apply for a legal title of 
ownership. However, nota bene it does not give the possessor right to receive the title.
64
 A 
possessor of land does however have similar rights as a legal owner does. In the courtroom, 
the difference in leverage between a certificate of possession and one of ownership is virtually 
negligible.
65
  
 
3.2.3 Ownership 
 
According to the 2001 Land Law, ownership can be individual, collective, or state. 
 
- Collective ownership 
 
Collective ownership is reserved for two different categories of land. The first category 
includes land within the premises of Buddhist monasteries and is property that cannot be sold 
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or in other ways divested.
66
 The second category refers to land on which indigenous 
communities are residing and where they carry out traditional agriculture. To be considered a 
member of this indigenous group, one must meet certain ethnic, cultural, and social criteria 
and cultivate the land according to customary rules of collective use.
67
 This property cannot 
be acquired by anyone outside of this indigenous community.
68
 Collective ownership will not 
be treated further in this thesis.  
 
- Individual ownership 
 
Individual ownership of land, also referred to as immovable property, is ownership by either a 
natural or a legal person.
69
 This ownership entitles the owner to an exclusive and extensive 
use of the property unless elsewhere prohibited by law.
70
 
 
- State Ownership 
 
Land owned by the kingdom of Cambodia is referred to as state ownership. State land can be 
either public or private. State Public Land is defined as property that “has a natural origin” 
such as forests, rivers and lakes. Property developed for general or public use such as roads, 
railways, airports, public parks, as well as property that “is allocated to render a public 
service” such as public schools and hospitals.71 State Private Land is land that is neither State 
Public Land nor privately, individually, or collectively, owned or possessed as explained 
above, i.e. the rest of the land in Cambodia.
72
 In reality, the state rarely distinguishes between 
the two types of state property, which further complicates the problem of land grabbing.
73
 
 
3.2.4 Turning State Public Property into State Private Property 
 
State Public Land is frequently made State Private Land through an infinite number sub-
decrees, used as a veil to cover up extralegal government activities. A sub-decree is 
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legislation, adopted by the Council of Ministers and signed by the Prime Minister, which must 
be in strict conformity with both the Constitution and the Law to which it refers.
74
 The 
purpose of a Sub-decree is often to elaborate on certain issues in an already implemented law. 
Sub-decrees are often created to allow subsequent development projects, as will be illustrated 
by the case studies below.  
 
It is stated in Article 16 that State Public Property cannot be subject to commercial 
transactions. However, when State Public Property loses its public interest it can be 
transformed into State Private Property through sub-decrees.
75
 Once the land is turned to State 
Private Property, it can thus be sold, concessioned and leased out accordingly.
76
 The sale, 
lease, or concession of State Public Property before it has been made State Private Property is 
illegal.
77
 
 
3.2.5 Expropriation 
 
The matter of expropriation is treated briefly in article 5 stating, “no person may be deprived 
of his ownership, unless it is in the public interest.” The expropriation must be carried out in 
accordance with the law and only after the person deprived of his ownership has received 
“fair and just compensation” for his property.78 What constitutes a public interest is not 
explained nor what constitutes fair and just compensation. Presumably, the compensation 
would refer to at least market value or replacement value for the property. According to the 
same article, the compensation should be made in advance, but there exist no guidelines on 
how to determine fair and just compensation. Neither are there any possibilities of appeal 
prescribed, nor any statutory penalties should compensation not be paid on time. Without this 
compensation, it is difficult for the individual to adjust properly to his new situation. This is 
however refuted by several interviewees, claiming that in many cases no compensation at all 
is offered for the expropriated land. In rural areas the inhabitants sometimes receive 
compensation in the form of other land that is not farmable.
79
 In urban areas compensation the 
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occupants usually receive some form of smaller compensation. Likely this is because of the 
high frequency of NGOs in the urban areas, making these cases more visible. It has been 
reported that the evaluation process is arbitrary, granting higher compensation to those 
educated and well-off who are more influential in their community.
80
  
 
What equals a public interest is determined by what benefits the Government. For the RGC 
development is a purported public interest. Development in this context should primarily be 
understood as construction of high-rise buildings in the capital and establishment of factories 
in rural areas, i.e. superficial development to create a façade of economic growth and 
progress. This “development” is claimed to benefit the public and stimulate economic growth.  
 
However, the use of the expropriation article is not as common as merely taking land, for the 
simple reason being that few people actually have proof that they are owners of the land due 
to the slow land registration process discussed below. Taking land from people lacking titles 
is more common, and perhaps simpler. The line between expropriation and simple land 
grabbing is as such blurry, in large due to delays in the land titling process in Cambodia. This 
has also contributed to difficulty in defining who is entitled to compensation according to this 
article. In its current form, the expropriation article only governs legitimate landholders, i.e. 
owners with land titles and not those with legitimate possession rights without title. Therefore, 
the only individuals who are entitled to compensation are the ones that hold title of ownership 
or possession and is the proper possessor or owner in accordance with the requirement above. 
As only 10 percent of Cambodian land has been officially titled, this leaves 90 percent of land 
untitled.
81
 In many land grabbing cases, it is uncertain who has the right of possession, or 
whether the property is state land, private or public. Many are as such precluded from the 
application of the expropriation article. Moreover, replacement value is determined by the 
government. In some cases, compensation has been based on market information from 
government land transaction records. This of course requires an actual active market and that 
the record information is reliable, which is often not the case, as land prices are understated in 
the records.
82
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In January 2010, a new expropriation law was approved by the Cambodian senate allowing 
authorities to “withdraw legal ownership on land” for public development purposes. The new 
legislation includes the establishment of an Independent Evaluation Commission for land with 
the purpose of ensuring that compensation is granted according to market prices.
83
 It is 
difficult to imagine how a new commission will bring about change, as it most likely will 
consist of the same government officials as before. Moreover, the new expropriation law does 
not offer any further guidance on the definition of “public interest,” which allows continued 
arbitrary takeover of land by powerful players supported by the government. Nor has any 
progress been made to ensure transparency in the expropriation process. With that said, any 
positive effects of this new legislation remain to be seen. 
 
3.2.6 Economic Land Concessions 
 
Chapter 5 governs the rules on land concessions. A land concession is a legal right given to an 
individual or legal entity to occupy land and exercise his rights on this land.
84
 This paper will 
only treat ELCs, which are land concessions responding to an economic development 
purpose
85
 allowing the beneficiaries to clear the land for industrial agricultural 
exploitation
86
.
87
  
 
Economic Land Concessions are granted primarily for industrial agricultural purposes. Most 
commonly, foreign companies use the land for sugar, rubber, and cassava plantations. 
Recently, rich Middle Eastern countries such as Kuwait and Qatar have been purchasing land 
for investment purposes, possibly following recent trends, and purchasing the land to grow 
crops for to feed their own population.
88
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An ELC may only be granted on State Private Property and may not exceed 10 000 hectares. 
Neither may one individual or legal entity be granted concessions that in total exceed 10 000 
hectares
89
. Moreover, they may only be granted ELCs for a maximum of 99 years.
90
 The 
granting of an ELC is conditional and may be revoked if it does not comply with the Land 
Law.
91
 It is further stated that the concession holders may not alter the land in such a way that 
it is damages “its natural structure” or so that it is destroyed.92 It should be noted that although 
the law prohibits foreigners from owning property, the law does not restrict them from 
obtaining ELCs.  
 
In 2005, the Sub-decree on Economic Land Concessions was signed with the objective of 
setting out general conditions that must be met in order for a concession to be granted. Before 
granting an ELC, the contracting authority shall conduct both an initial Environmental and 
Social Impact Assessment of the proposed project that will take place on the land.
93
 If the EIA 
or SIA indicates that the concession at hand could have a negative effect, a full EIA or SIA 
should be conducted. For an ELC to at all be granted the land must be registered and 
classified as state private land in the land registered and EIAs and SIAs must have been 
completed.
94
 In reality, EIAs are seldom conducted properly. More often than not, the state 
official does not even leave his office to visit the sights, in order to determine possible 
negative environmental effects of the prospective industry.
95
 
 
The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries reports that, as of April 2010, 85 ELCs 
with a total land area of 956 690 hectares have been granted.
96
 This constitutes 5.3 percent of 
Cambodia’s total land area. The arable land in Cambodia however only amounts to 21.5 
percent as of 2007.
97
 It should however be noted that ELCs under 1000 hectares are not listed 
and there is as such no way to find information on these. Moreover, as most of Cambodia is 
untitled, the coordinates are not reliable and the information on the MAFF’s website should 
perhaps thus be read with certain skepticism. Nota bene, this does not include sales, leases or 
mining or logging concessions. 
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4. Land Titling 
 
There are two ways in which land can be titled, through Systematic Land Registration and 
through Sporadic Land Registration. The Cadastral Administration is the authority with the 
primary duty of carrying out Systematic Land Registration, reinforcing the sporadic 
registration system as well as producing and maintaining the Land Register. As such, the 
issuance of certificates of ownership and possession is provided by the Cadastral 
Administration,
98
 who also produces Cadastral Index Maps
99
 and the Land Register
100
. The 
RGC have been dependent on international aid to finance the project, as it requires very 
technical equipment and staff to conduct the registration. These land certificates are then 
listed in the land register.
101
 As registered land is protected by law, it is of course important 
that this procedure is carried out, even though as will been shown in this paper, a certificate of 
ownership is no guarantee that the land is de facto secure. 
 
4.1 Sporadic Land Registration 
 
Sporadic Land Registration offers the individual a Sporadic Registration Certificate. Sporadic 
land registration has been possible since the introduction of land privatization in 1989.
102
 The 
sporadic land registration is carried out on a case-by-case basis by the provincial branches of 
Ministry of Land Management, Urban Planning, and Construction on the initiative of the 
individual who wishes to be granted a sporadic registration certificate of ownership. As such, 
they are voluntary. This is a very slow and bureaucratic process as the procedure travels 
through several different offices, each of them with different duties.
103
 A sporadic registration 
certificate does not have accurate coordinates, which makes the sporadic registration title 
weaker than the systematic registration certificate.
104
 One advantage with the sporadic land 
registration however, is that the certificate can be applied for at any time. 
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4.2 Systematic Land Registration 
 
Systematic Land Registration offers the individual a Systematic Registration Certificate. The 
Systematic Registration Certificate is realized using aerial photos and GPS-equipment, which 
offers exact and accurate coordinates for the boundaries of the property. The government 
selects which areas to title and sends out teams to measure the land holdings and subsequently 
issue titles.
105
 The systematic land registration is conducted by the government agencies, 
previously through the Land Management and Administration Project.
106
  
 
4.3 The Land Management and Administration Project 
 
The Land Management and Administration Project was a multi-donor project primarily 
funded by the World Bank. The project first began in 2002 with the purpose of assisting the 
government of Cambodia to implement key provisions of the 2001 Land Law. More 
specifically the goal of the project was to, over a 15-year period, strengthen land tenure 
security and the institutions involved, including the cadastral commission, as well as 
promoting the development of efficient land markets Under the LMAP nearly one million lots 
of land were registered and titled. In September 2009, however the WB decided to terminate 
the project. At the outset of the project, it was agreed that the project would not “title lands in 
areas where disputes are likely until agreements are reached on the status of the Land.” 107 
This resulted in the LMAP being more successful in the rural areas than the urban areas where 
land disputes are more common. The WB also failed at negotiating with the government on 
whether the LMAP’s social and environmental protection should also be implemented in 
urban areas. For the WB, the implementation of these safeguard policies was critical. 
Therefore, the project was cancelled.
108
 
 
In reality what instigated the reviewing process was a complaint by Cambodia based NGOs 
claiming that the WB had failed to supervise the LMAP. Just prior to the municipality of 
Phnom Penh granting the 99-year lease to Shukaku Inc.,
109
 the LMAP had allegedly denied 
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land titles to the Boeung Kak residents and excluded them from the titling system when land 
registration was carried out in their area in 2006.
110
 The Cambodian government was 
unwilling to discuss with the WB measures to bring the project back in compliance and stated 
that the WB’s “complicated conditions” as a primary reason for ending the project.111 The 
WB wanted the Cambodian government to explain and correct the fact that these areas had 
been excluded from land titling without justification. Apparently, the government had no 
desire to do so. What followed was a termination of the project as the partnership with the 
WB was stated by the Prime Minister to be “difficult and complicated" and having “too many 
conditions."
112
  
 
With no more funding for systematic land titling projects, this will considerably slow down 
the land titling registration and it will be many years before all land in Cambodia is titled. One 
interviewee stated that without proper funding, this undertaking could take 100 years, 
meaning that there is no end in sight for land disputes.
113
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5. Land grabbing through lease and sale 
 
Real estate prices in Phnom Penh have soared in the past few years and turned the capital into 
a city only for rich Cambodians. This is in large due to the problem of land grabbing and the 
forced evictions that inevitably follow.
114
 These disenfranchised people are relocated to slum 
areas on the edge of town.
115
 Perhaps the most tragic of this is that many companies purchase 
land in urban areas, predominantly for pure speculation purposes. Many view Cambodia as a 
potential gold mine, hoping for the same economic boost that Thailand has seen in the past 
years. If and when development comes and property prices rise even higher, they are hoping 
to sell the land for a substantial amount of money and make a large profit. Speculation in 
property has played a large role in the property prices in Phnom Penh sky rocketing.
116
 
According to one interviewee, only ten percent of all concessioned land was actually being 
used which further strengthens the theory that many investors are acquiring land for pure 
speculation purposes.
117
 In the meantime, this land simply sits there, fenced off as a reminder 
of the waste and injustice of it all. 
 
The manners in which land is acquired by the various corporations differ immensely. Two 
case studies will follow in the chapter below, to provide a clear understanding of how the 
government extralegally seizes and subsequently leases out or sells the land to the highest 
bidder Some aspects of land grabbing remain consistent however. A third case study is also 
provided to offer yet an example of who the buyers of land often are and what the land is to 
be used for.   
 
It is stated in the 2001 Land Law that only Cambodian individuals and companies can own 
private property in Cambodia.
118
 A company that is registered in Cambodia and in which at 
least 51 percent of the shares are held by Cambodian persons, natural or legal, is considered a 
Cambodian company, and can as such be the owner of private property.
119
 Claiming that 
malicious foreign companies come in, take over, and exploit Cambodian land for their own 
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gain would therefore be to oversimplify quite a bit. In reality, it is the Oknhas
120
 who partner 
up with foreign companies to create joint ventures. The companies associate themselves with 
Cambodians who have already acquired land concessions.
121
 Without the help of a local 
businessman to facilitate the process it is nearly impossible for a foreign company to do 
business in Cambodia. This is of course connected to the patronage system and knowing 
whom to bribe. Moreover, foreigners are not allowed to own real estate in Cambodia. 
However, sources say that if the prospective investment is large enough, it is possible to get 
around this legal hurdle by being granted citizenship as the investment is viewed as a 
contribution to Cambodia.
122
 Needless to say there exists no open bidding for the land.  
 
Many of the companies created are in fact shell corporations created to absorb the bad press 
that is the result of individuals being evicted from the grabbed land.
123
 Typing the companies’ 
names into search engines will only render results related to the land grabbing as the company 
is created solely for the aforementioned purpose. Some years later, the property will then be 
transferred to the real company.  
 
5.1 The Concept of an Oknha 
 
Oknhas are often mentioned in the forefront of land grabbing cases and the concept can been 
viewed as a further indication of the prominence of the Cambodian patronage system. Oknha 
is a prestigious title that was created in 1994, by Prime Minister Hun Sen. To be bestowed the 
title, which is awarded by the king, a person must have made charitable donations to the state 
serving the public such as basic infrastructures, schools or hospitals to a sum of at least 
100 000 USD. To date around 220 Oknhas have been titled. Mainly businessmen have been 
awarded the title and the majority of members in the Chamber of Commerce are Oknhas and a 
part of the CPP. However, some simply bribe the Prime Minister to be granted the title.
124
  
 
This title is a title that is a “first class ticket” to become one of the ruling elite. These Oknhas 
thereafter continue to grow richer and more powerful through abuse of Cambodia’s natural 
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resources and suppressing the rights of anyone who stands in their way.
125
 As the Oknhas are 
rich and powerful, they will use coercion and threats to deal with problems and circumventing 
the legal system. Being an Oknha or closely connected to an Oknha, brings a certain security 
implying that no one will dare to stand up to that person. Heng quotes the following 
Cambodian saying: “before beating a dog, you should find out who the master is,” 126 which 
accurately illustrates the power that an Oknha possesses. Even judges are unlikely to go 
against the wishes of these powerful individuals.
127
 Those who take refuge under the umbrella 
of the Oknha are afforded protection, as no one would dare take action against these people.
128
 
 
5.2 The Koh Pich Case 
 
Koh Pich is a 100-hectare island in the Tonle Bassac River in Phnom Penh, which was at first 
leased to Canadia Bank. The municipality of Phnom Penh came to an agreement with Canadia 
Bank to start investments on the island. This business deal was clouded in secrecy and the 
transparency nonexistent. The identity of the corporation was kept secret from everybody 
except the Ministry of Commerce. Shortly after the evacuation of the families living on the 
island, the lease contract was turned into a contract of purchase and the corporation was 
granted a certificate of ownership. It is now known that the buyer of the land is Canadia Bank 
who is using the land for investment and speculation purposes.
129
 Canadia Bank is a joint 
venture between Cambodian expatriates returning from Canada and the National Bank of 
Cambodia.
130
  
 
The compensation issued to the families living on the island was very low and did not 
constitute fair and just compensation in accordance with the 2001 Land Law or the 
Constitution. Some however accepted this, while others, mainly those with proper 
documentation, i.e. land titles, chose to fight for their rights to fair and just compensation. 
Depending on the size of land, families were offered around 5000 USD in compensation for 
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their land.
131
 The cost of a proper house in the Phnom Penh area is approximately 300 000 
USD.
132
  
 
It is widely known that the same people who sit in the government as well as their family and 
friends, own the corporations that buy and lease the land. However, due to the lack of 
transparency and free press in Cambodia this is not publicly confirmed, as these commitments 
would be incompatible with their positions in the government.
133
 Moreover, such information 
would not be made public for fear of accusations of corruption and as these companies are 
deeply involved in land grabbing cases. As late as last year, it was reported that Prime 
Minister Hun Sen’s wife and children were large shareholders in Canadia bank.134 Be this true 
or not, Prime Minister Hun Sen is very much engaged in the promotion of the new and 
“improved” Koh Pich.135  
 
5.3 The Boueng Kak Case 
 
The Boeung Kak is a lake located in central Phnom Penh. This case has and is still receiving a 
lot of public attention in the form of protests, very much because of its central location close 
to many NGOs. The dispute started in 2007 when the company Shukaku Inc. was granted a 
99-year lease for the lake and its immediate surroundings by the Cambodian government with 
the purpose of developing a 133-hectare area of land. This area was inhabited by 4000 
families who would naturally be affected by this agreement through eviction. This lease 
agreement is questionable is several ways. Market value for this property in the center of 
Phnom Penh has been estimated to be worth up to 3000 USD per square meter. Shukaku Inc. 
is currently leasing the property for 65 USD per square meter during the entirety of the lease, 
i.e. for 99 years to come.
136
 Today, the process of filling the lake with cement in preparation 
for development projects, is now well on its way.   
 
There is no information to be found about the company Shukaku Inc. The real company 
behind it is in fact Pheapimex who it shares the same address as Shukaku Inc. The director of 
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both companies is Lao Meng Kim
137, also a head senator of the Cambodian People’s Party as 
well as the owner of the controversial company Wuzhishan LS Group. His wife, Choeung 
Sopheap
138
, is the owner of both these companies. She is also a leading member of the 
Cambodian Red Cross.
139
 The first time Shukaku Inc. spoke publicly about the affair was in 
September 2010, three whole years after the lease was granted.  
 
Pheapimex is a very controversial logging company that is often mentioned in the press, 
associated with land grabbing and deforestation.
140
 As one of Cambodia’s most powerful 
companies, it controls 7.4 percent of Cambodia’s total land areas through concessions 
alone.
141
 In various cases the concessions far exceed the legal limit of 10 000 hectares. For 
example, in January 2000 Pheapimex, who has a history of being granted illegally sized land 
concessions, was granted an economic land concession spanning over 300 000 hectares of 
land.
142
 According to BABC, Pheapimex is also a major donor to the CPP.
143
 
 
First, it should be understood that the Boeung Kak Lake at the time of the granting of the 
lease, constituted State Public Property as defined above.
144
 Article 15 clearly states that lakes 
constitute State Public Property. Leasing State Public Property is legal if it follows the 
procedure set up in article 17, i.e. in accordance with the sub-decree. Only when State Public 
Property loses its public interest, can it be transformed into State Private Property in 
accordance with Article 16. According to the same article, in order for it to be considered 
legal, the lease must be “temporary, precarious, and revocable.” A 99-year lease contract on 
land already inhabited by 4000 families can hardly be considered temporary or precarious. It 
is further stated that this lease cannot be turned into an ownership right. As stated by the sub-
decree, the lease may not exceed 15 years, in any way change the character of, or cause 
damage to the leased area regarding its public service use.
145
 It would be hard to dispute that 
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the filling of a lake with cement does not completely ruin the public service and use of the 
lake. 
 
One may pose the question why the government did not first turn the lake and its 
surroundings from State Public Property to State Private Property before entering the lease 
agreements, making the 99-year lease legal. However, another problem would have quickly 
arisen had then chosen to do so. The settlers around the lake area would most likely have met 
the requirements to have the right to apply for title of possession or ownership as described 
above.
146
 
 
All the above is presuming that the inhabitants of the land, did not have title of ownership, in 
which case the land would of course have constituted individual private property. Regardless 
of an actual title of ownership, the possessors of the land had the right to apply for possession 
as has been described previously.
147
 This would have made the lease invalid according to 
Article 33. If the people actually already held title of ownership over the property, the lease 
would have been illegal as previously stated. The government cannot grant leases to property 
that it does not own.  
 
If the individuals had held possessory rights over the property, the people would have had the 
right to apply for title of ownership, also making the lease invalid as a possession right 
constitutes a right in rem.
148
 As such, the lease infringed the rights of the titleholders (both 
ownership and possession) possibly constituting a penal offense and damages should have 
been compensated accordingly.
149
  
 
Providing the individuals held titles of ownership, the government could have used the 
expropriation article by showing that the development constituted public interest in 
accordance with Article 5. Nevertheless, this would have entailed that they provide just and 
fair compensation for the property in advance, i.e. before the lease, which of course is not a 
desirable outcome for the kleptocracy. 
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By illegally granting the lease for state public property, the government avoided paying 
compensation. Moreover, they let Shukaku Inc. take the heat both in the press and from the 
affected lakeside residents as well as footing the bill. To date, Shukaku Inc. have still not 
divulged exactly what they plan to use the property for which further accentuates the lack of 
transparency in process from beginning to end.
150
 The municipality on its end has stated that 
the development will provide “pleasant, trade, and service places for domestic and 
international tourists.”151  
 
5.4 The Otres Beach Case 
 
In some circumstances, people are shut off from their land simply to make way for so-called 
beautification projects. In 2010, Otres beach in Sihanoukville was shut down and 70 
businesses on the public beach were evicted. As the beach constituted public property, the 
residents were not legally occupying the beach the authorities claimed. This piece of land is 
now shut off waiting to be turned into a public park.
152
 Knowing that the beach would shortly 
be turned into a municipal garden, the authorities still accepted money to grant business 
licenses.
153
 
 
Some weeks after the evictions, it was made public that the people evicted had accepted 
compensation, which amounted to 4000 USD for business owners and 1500 USD from 
landless vendors. This compensation is not nearly enough money to start a new business. The 
purpose of the park is allegedly that Otres beach will become more attractive for tourists.
154
 In 
reality, the authorities are most likely holding out for the highest bidder. Tourism has grown 
in the coastal areas during the last 10 years or so and Sihanoukville has been deemed by many 
to become the new Phuket. Land grabbing for pure speculation purposes has thus become a 
lucrative business. The authorities of Sihanoukville are likely to receive a great deal of money 
from the next Oknha who has his sights set on building the next giant resort hotel. Already 
beaches have been shut off to make way for large hotel chains owned by Oknhas.
155
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6. Land grabbing through Economic Land Concessions 
 
Land grabbings in rural areas are often realized to establish agro-industries in the form of 
Economic Land Concessions. Land is deforested to make way for sugar, cassava, oil palm 
plantations etc. The high deforestation rate in Cambodia caused by these industries has 
decreased during the past years to a certain extent, but this remains a major problem. 
Moreover, the crops planted are not always suitable for the Cambodian vegetation. The 
cassava tree for example absorbs enormous amounts of water. In Thailand, it is even referred 
to the “tree of death,” as it will drain the soil beneath it, killing all other crops and vegetation 
in the immediate area.
156
 Needless to say, this has dire consequences for the Cambodian 
biodiversity. Access to water in Cambodia is a major problem in general and the agricultural 
industries absorb a lot of water. Because of this, the concessions are often granted upstream so 
that they can block the water supply. There is no transparency in the process of granting 
concessions and as previously touched upon, they are often too large, exceeding the 10 000 
hectare limit.  
 
6.1 The Prey Lang Forest 
 
As this paper is being written, the Prey Lang forest is under threat of being logged. The forest 
is home to self-sufficient families living off the forest. Deforestation of the Prey Land forest 
would have dire consequences for not only the forest, the families and its wild life but also for 
Cambodia as a whole. As is, the Prey Lang forest acts as a sponge, soaking up water during 
the rain seasons, preventing flooding while during the dry season allocating water. 
Deforestation of the Prey Lang equals loss of biodiversity in a country that already has a high 
deforestation rate in part due to ELCs.
157
 Prey Lang is also home to wild life and many of 
Cambodia’s endangered species inhabit the forest.  
 
The people of the Prey Lang forest first found out that they were losing their land and that it 
had been concessioned, when they were suddenly cut off from their land. Exactly whom the 
land has been commissioned to has not yet been made public. As one concession may not 
exceed 10 000 square meters, the land has been divided into four different concessions, 
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10 000 square meters each. That it is illegal to grant more than 10 000 square meters of land 
to one person (be it an individual or a legal person) regardless of how many concessions the 
land has been split up into, seems to be ignored by the government. 
 
The communities of the Prey Lang forest have now joined forces to try to reach an agreement 
with the government. The above arguments have proved less fertile in persuading the 
government not to concession the land and the community has now come up with the idea to 
use the forest to sell carbon credits. It has been estimated that this could generate 12-15 
million USD per annum for the government.
158
 This would provide the government with a 
monetary incentive to keep preserving the forest while at the same time reducing emissions of 
greenhouse gases. 
 
6.2 Ly Yong Phat and the Sugar Plantations 
 
The largest concessions in Cambodia are granted to sugar plantations. One of the central 
figures in Cambodia’s sugar industry is the Oknha Ly Yong Phat who is also a senator 
member of the CPP and very close to Prime Minister Hun Sen. He is the owner of Phnom 
Penh Sugar Company and the L.Y.P group. Ly Yong Phat works with Thai sugar producers 
mainly KSL and Mitr Phol who are two of the largest sugar producers in Thailand. Phat also 
sits on the board of the Cambodian Red Cross.
159
 KSL has several subsidiary companies, one 
of them being Khon Kaen Sugar Industry, which in turn owns 50 percent of Koh Kong 
Plantation, which is registered to Ly Yong Phat. Ly Yong Phat is also involved with Mitr 
Phol. All of these companies have several sugar concessions, registered separately to avoid 
laws capping economic land concessions at 10 000 hectares.
160
  
 
There are two main reasons for why Thai companies are so eager to produce sugar in 
Cambodia. Firstly, Thai regulations demand that thirty percent of the sugar production 
remains within the local market so to prevent the price of sugar from sky rocketing. There is 
no such regulation in Cambodia, likely because the government simply does not care about 
this. Secondly, the Thai sugar companies are taking advantage of the European Union’s 
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Everything But Arms Regulation
161
. Basically, the EBA regulation provides the least 
developed countries (LDCs) with duty-free and quota-free access to the European Union 
market on all imports except arms and ammunition.
162
 Unlike Thailand, Cambodia is 
considered an LDC and companies based in the country can therefore benefit from the 
regulation.  
6.3 Comments 
 
The above cases are of course exacerbated by the fact that neither the government nor the 
inhabitants know what constitutes state public land, state private land, or individual land. A 
large problem contributing to this problem is the slow process of land registration. To date, 
only 10 percent of Cambodia’s land has been registered. 
 
The 2001 Land Law was drafted to fill the void of the old law so that it would be in 
accordance with the 1993 constitution. At the time, there was a lot of pressure from aid 
donors to draft a new progressive land law. Nevertheless, perhaps there was not enough 
pressure to ensure its proper implementation. For instance, when the current land law came 
into use, a sub-decree to protect and define land of indigenous groups was to be drafted. This 
sub-decree was not completed until 2007, after almost all this land had been sold or turned 
into concessions.
163
  
 
Since the UNTAC period, donors have pumped in money to the Cambodian government for 
them to realize the judicial reform program. The progress in this area has however been very, 
very slow.
164
 In reality, a judicial reform is not in the best interest of the Cambodian 
kleptocratic government and therefore is very unlikely to be realized. The Government can 
keep passing one progressive law after another, but this will have no effect if the same 
regulation is disregarded by a court acting as a puppet for the ruling party, primarily 
promoting the Government’s financial and political interests. There remains a lack of 
commitment from the Government who instead of promoting the interests of the citizens of 
Cambodia, is protecting the economic interests of the rich and powerful, putting Cambodia’s 
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land and natural resources on sale. Nevertheless, international donors continue to commit 
large sums of aid to legal and judicial reform.  
 
Not only is the implementation of the land law is systematically ignored by the authorities but 
the articles of the law are misused by the courts who manipulate the penal code to punish 
community leaders and thereby suppress community uprisings. An example of this is how the 
courts will use the trespassing article in the penal code. Even though the judge acknowledges 
that the owner of the property has not yet been identified, the judge will still find the 
community leader guilty of trespassing.
165
 In another case, villagers attempting to harvest 
their rice crops on disputed land were convicted of robbery, sentenced to prison, and ordered 
to pay compensation.
166
 Other ways that the state will abuse the land law is by simply not 
granting land titles to valuable property as was done in the Boeung Kak Case.
167
 
 
Repeatedly, the government emphasizes that the selling of land and granting of concessions is 
necessary for development. However, sources say that it seems as though the bad publicity 
that these companies have received, may be scaring foreign investors off and perhaps instead 
impeding FDI in Cambodia. Newspapers reported protests outside the embassies of the 
countries whose corporations had been cited in the land grabbing context.
168
 During the past 
10 years Cambodia has suffered a declining FDI due in large to the widespread corruption and 
weak governance.
169
 However, it is difficult to avoid corruption when doing business in 
Cambodia. A foreign company attempting to play fair will soon learn that this is impossible 
without an Oknha to guide through the jungle of kleptocracy.
170
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7. The Cambodian Legal system 
 
A modern Cambodian legal system was first introduced by the French at the beginning of the 
19
th
 century, during the colonial rule. This lasted until the KR seize of Cambodia, which 
completely put an end to the rule of law. Under this time however, not many Cambodians 
came into contact with the court system.
171
 Not only were almost all jurists killed, but also 
schools, books, court buildings, and legal texts were destroyed. When the DK regime ended in 
1979, the PRK attempted to reestablish a legal system. However, as there were no jurists to 
fill the void, the PRK gave short legal training courses to “former school teachers and literate 
Cambodians” with no connection to the previous regime.172 Since then a distrust of the court 
and an idea that the government needs to monitor the court has remained and up until the 
1993 constitution there remained an “overlapping relationship between the judicial and 
executive branches.”173 
 
The 1993 Constitution states, “The judicial power shall be an independent power”174 and 
further that “judicial power shall not be granted to the legislative or executive branches.”175 
This of course does not guarantee a de facto compliance with the above articles. In reality, the 
Cambodian judicial system is suffering from corruption, patronage politics, and impunity. 
There is no system of checks and balances in place, and the separation of powers codified in 
the Cambodian constitution, is in practice nonexistent.
176
  
 
7.2. The Cambodian Courts and the Cadastral Commission 
 
The advent of UNTAC brought about fundamental changes to the Cambodian court system by 
creating an Appellate court. The Cambodian court system consists of three levels; the 
Municipal and Provincial Courts, which are both courts of first instance, the Appellate Court 
and the Supreme Court. Undisputed land, i.e. land that is registered is treated in this system. 
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Cases dealing with unregistered land are heard in the Special Cadastral Commission, which 
like the court system consists of three tiers: Local Cadastral Commission, 
Provincial/Municipal Cadastral Commission, and finally the National Cadastral 
Commission.
177
 The Cadastral Commission is commissioned to resolve conflicts between 
possessors over unregistered land subject to possession rights and to decide recognition of the 
lawful possessor.
178
 After a case has been heard in the National Cadastral Commission, a 
review of the decision is still possible. Appeals are filed with the Court of Appeal, who will 
revert the cases back to the Cadastral Commission if it sees fit.
179
 
 
In theory, having a special commission specialized in resolving complicated land disputes is 
an admirable attempt to grant special concern to a notoriously challenging impediment to 
Cambodian development. In practice, the system of two different dispute resolutions 
mechanisms is abused and the complainants are placed in a perhaps even worse position than 
before. Cases non gratae, i.e. most cases, are sent back and forth from the Cadastral 
Commission to the Municipal and Provincial Courts claiming that they do not possess proper 
jurisdiction. This can be done indefinitely and eventually cases are simply lost.
180
 
 
In 2008, the Boeung Kak case the court rejected the case with the justification that it lacked 
jurisdiction to hear it and claimed that should be handled by the Cadastral Commission. On 
appeal, the court claimed that Shukaku Inc. was not the right party to complain against and 
kept finding different reasons for not hearing the case. Allegedly, the court clerks were 
demanding large amounts of money simply to file the complaints.
181
 
 
7.3 Cambodians and the Courts 
 
Cambodia has a history of traditionally solving disputes through “peaceful compromise” 
instead of going to the courts. As such, Cambodians prefer reaching mutual agreements to 
problems. Of course, the widespread corruption in Cambodia inevitably contributes to the 
distrust of state institutions including the court. More often than not, the poor are the primary 
                                                          
177
 Sub Decree on Organization and Functioning of the Cadastral Commission, Article 4 
178
 Ibid., Article 2 
179
 Ibid., Article 23 
180
 Interviewee no. 2 
181
 BabCambodia. Challenging Forced Evictions in Cambodia: The Boeung Kak Case. 
46 
 
victims of the corruption.
182
 Furthermore, there is a certain resistance among Cambodians to 
actually take a case to court. It lies within the Cambodian culture to attempt to negotiate and 
reconcile when conflicts or disputes arise. The modern court system is a quite new concept to 
Cambodians. Even when cases are taken to court the court will first attempt to reconcile the 
parties before going to trial. Moreover, there is a notion that avoiding a problem is “the 
socially appropriate response when one finds oneself in conflict with a more powerful 
person.”183 A study by the WB also found that the legal institutions above were “perceived as 
costly, time consuming and biased toward the rich” by the villagers included in the study. It 
seems as though they would rather take the disputes directly to the state representatives such 
as the Prime Minister, as they were seen as the ones having the real power to solve a dispute. 
Even officials stated that they found solutions by the above institutions to be “time consuming 
and unreliable.”184 In addition, to be able to solve a dispute it is vital to have the right 
connections, the Cambodian concept of having kse
185
. A person that has strong kse can easily 
solve his disputes through “direct compensation to a plaintiff “or “securing” the innocence of 
the prosecuted.
186
 
  
                                                          
182
 Sreang, op. cit., p. 21 
183
 WB, Phnom Penh. Justice for the poor? An exploratory study of Collective Grievances over land and local 
Governance in Cambodia, p.13 
184
 Ibid., pp. 37-38 
185
 Kse literally means a pipeline through which power flows. 
186
 Sreang, op. cit.,  p. 20 
47 
 
8. The Patronage System 
 
Cambodian patronage is omnipresent and plays a great deal in Cambodian society today, 
especially in the legal and political world. Therefore, a short history of the Cambodian 
patronage system is required. According to Chandler, Cambodians have always identified 
themselves in terms of their relationship to others. A relationship with someone of a certain 
status reflected upon and defined one’s self. To protect themselves they would seek out a 
person within the group that had a secure position and offer homage to this person. These 
people in secure positions were older or more fortunate members of the group, perhaps even 
government officials. The society was fueled by the exchange of protection and service 
implied in these lopsided friendships.
187
  
 
Patronage would become even more vital in non-rice growing villages as having a patron was 
necessary even to survive. A man without a patron was considered fair game and would have 
a hard time defending himself and his interests. People in powerful positions would take on 
slaves that would contract debt to their patrons, in exchange for protection. They would spend 
a lifetime working these debts off.
188
  
8.1 Patronage within the court system  
 
The old Cambodian patronage system permeates every part of Cambodian society, not least 
the court system. Powerful people have more influence in society, as in the court system. It 
benefits to get in good with influential people, as they will then protect you and maintain 
loyalty to you. People return favors, as there is a desire to maintain a personal relationship and 
maintain backing from higher authorities as well as a fear of retribution if they do not do as 
the high-ranking government officials and Oknhas wish. As such, the corruption does not 
necessarily amount only to financial corruption.
189
 In order to acquire and retain their jobs 
within the court system, the employees must bribe the people above them. This includes 
maintaining regular payments to their superior or patrons and even buying gifts or paying for 
meals. Needless to say, this is costly as they will have to earn the money back.
190
 This is why 
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court clerks often take a fee to administer a case.
191
 It is also common that an Oknha will go 
to a minister, asking him to intervene in the case. Un describes a saying among the 
Cambodians that expresses the sentiment of the Cambodian people regarding the legal 
system: ”the court in Cambodia uses the scale to weigh money but not to seek justice.”192 
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9. Corruption in the Court System 
9.1. The Recruitment of Judges and Prosecutors 
 
It costs approximately 75 000 USD to pass an exam to become a judge or prosecutor in 
Cambodia. The prosecutors and judges take the same classes and must pass the same exam. 
For comparison purposes it could again be worth mentioning that a standard house in Phnom 
Penh costs around 300 000 USD. This is not money that most Khmer, or even the elite, have 
access to. This money is usually borrowed from wealthy connections with a promise of 
repayment and most likely judicial favors. In office, a judge or prosecutor will make about 
400-500 USD a month depending on their positions,
193
 which stands well above the average 
income level in the Phnom Penh area of about 200-300 USD. The low salaries in relation to 
the real cost of becoming a judge makes them susceptible to bribery and inevitably 
encourages corruption. Paying 75 000 USD to qualify for a job that will earn you 500 USD a 
month does not add up. In reality the judges make those 75 000 USD back in one month with 
the help of bribes and are thus able to repay their charitable benefactors. Of course, the 
possibility of becoming a judge is reserved for the already wealthy. Someone who is not a 
member of the Khmer elite would not have the connections and possibility of being granted a 
loan and thus being reserved a seat as a judge.
194
 
 
This debauched manner of recruiting judges and prosecutors will inevitably lead to an 
imbalance of knowledge within the judicial system. A disparity exacerbated by the fact that as 
a result of the many jurists executed during the Khmer Rouge regime, unqualified people with 
no legal background were placed in high positions within the court system. Furthermore, there 
has been a lack of proper legal education in Cambodia. The lack of legal knowledge is evident 
in the court proceeding with lawyers not knowing how to properly present evidence or hold 
cross-examinations.
195
 In 2004, only one in six of Cambodia’s 117 judges held a law degree 
while only 10 percent of public prosecutors held one.
 196
 In 2007, there were only 300 lawyers 
in Cambodia and no more than 225 judges, which is 17 per one million citizens. The court 
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judgments are not documented transparently by the judges who seldom justify their rulings 
even though this is required by law.
197
 
 
Notwithstanding the lack of human resources, there is also a great deal lacking in material 
resources. Courthouses are deteriorating, there is no material, and the personnel are expected 
to contribute with office supplies including bringing their own computers.
198
 This is a clear 
indicator of the lack of status that the judicial system is granted by the Cambodian 
government. Licadho states that the few initiatives to punish corruption within the legal 
system have been “cosmetic and temporary.”199 Meanwhile, the Prime Minister and the 
Ministry of Land Management, Urban Planning and Construction sit in gaudy, colossal 
buildings with exteriors that could easiest be described as a hybrid between a Las Vegas 
Casino and the Los Angeles Church of Scientology.  
 
9.2. The Court as a Government puppet 
 
The Cambodian court system cannot be said to be either independent or impartial. In reality, 
the court is under government control. The government and the courts are closely 
interconnected and a judge will often also act as an advisor to a minister.
200
 Needless to say, a 
judge will not rule to the detriment of their bosses, as a ruling unfavorable to the government 
can be the end of a judge’s career. Naturally, this fear undermines judicial independence. In 
some cases, government officials themselves will even contact the judges or prosecutors to 
ask them to “resolve the case according to the law,” with the result that they often submit to 
the requests out of pure and simple fear.
201
 Prospective cases are also categorized as being 
more or less important depending on how much money can be made from them as well as 
who the cases involve. If a case is considered unimportant, the documents relating to this case 
will quickly be lost by the court staff. 
202
 
 
Corruption is common in post-conflict and developing countries, Cambodia being no 
exception. Cambodia has a CPI score of 2.0 on the TI Corruption Perceptions Index, meaning 
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that the public sector is highly corrupt.
203
 In post-conflict countries custom to war and 
uncertainties, a government will perhaps think short-term, attempting to maximize their own 
personal profits, knowing that stability is fleeting. However, the corruption in Cambodia is 
not solely a byproduct of bad governance. Corruption is in fact the foundation on which the 
CPP rules the country. The higher up the ladder you want to get, the more you pay to get and 
stay there, putting you in the position of having to take bribes to pay the people above you. 
One of the NGO workers interviewed even described Cambodia as being a Mafia State, which 
unfortunately rings very true.
204
 The CPP controls all government sectors of the country, 
including the legal system.  
 
9.3 The Execution of Court Rulings 
 
The police who should in fact be implementing the court rulings or warrants, in turn act 
almost as an appellate court, not executing court orders that they disagree with and deciding 
whether the ruling is fair. As it is the Ministry of Interior that controls salaries, promotions 
and demotions of the police force, the police will not do anything to jeopardize their bosses 
and thereby their jobs.
205
 A fair trial and ruling in one’s favor will as such not guarantee that 
the ruling is de facto executed. A source at Licadho recollects one case in which the 
community actually won. Later, the military police came and evicted them anyway.
206
 These 
police evictions are often very violent and have in some cases even led to fatalities.
207
 In 
several cases, villagers protesting the evictions have even faced defamation charges after 
filing complaints about the incidents where they have been shot.
208
  
 
9.4 Land Grabbing in the Media  
 
The ruling party has created a façade of democracy to be granted international donors money 
and aid. Freedom of expression and free press do exist to a certain extent and land grabbings 
are reported somewhat in English speaking newspapers.  
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In 1995, a Law on Press Regime was enacted to guarantee free press and prohibit censorship. 
However, publications that “harm national security or political stability or humiliate national 
organs” are restricted by law.209 Television and radio stations nevertheless remain under 
government control and journalists that criticize the ruling party can be subjected to 
imprisonment or attacks, in some cases even death.
210
 Journalists who write articles critical of 
the ruling party are at risk of being prosecuted for crimes such as defamation or 
disinformation. Naturally, this increases the risk of self-censorship. Moreover, these papers 
are, as mentioned above, in English. In a country where 25 percent of the population is 
illiterate and where English speakers are scarce, free press means nothing.
211
 It is all about 
creating a cozy bubble for the diplomats and UN workers so to keep extracting aid. One does 
not have to travel far outside of Phnom Penh to experience extreme poverty, but evidently, 
there is no need to do so when the capital offers expatriates everything they could possibly 
need. There are French restaurants, American bars, Thai Spas, and supermarkets à la 
Walmart, creating a comfortable illusion of ongoing development and progress.  
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10.  Land grabbings and the Future 
 
10.1 Creating a Recipe for Social Unrest 
 
In 2009, Amnesty reports that at least 26 forced evictions displaced approximately 27 000 
people.
212
 These people are relocated to remote places, without access to electricity or clean 
water where they live in dire and inhumane situations, far from their original homes and jobs. 
Others are simply left homeless.
213
 People with diseases such as HIV are often even more 
marginalized and put in special colored huts without basic sanitation or any form of health 
care.
214
 This increases the stigmatization even more.   
 
The jobs that are offered by the agroindustries, being granted ELCs, are seasonal, low paid 
jobs without any employment security. Furthermore, these jobs are not offered to the locals 
who lost their land and livelihood but to outsiders who are taken in. One explanation for this 
is the great indignation among the locals against the company who has cleared their land 
through violence and threats. Even if jobs were offered to the local communities, these would 
hardly be sufficient in filling the void of all the community’s lost livelihoods. The foreign 
companies use foreign machinery and foreign seasonal work force. Thereafter the produce is 
exported. As the Cambodian tax system is close to nonexistent, no money enters the pockets 
of the Cambodian people. The only Cambodians benefiting from the so-called development 
projects are the Khmer elite shareholders. Meanwhile the already disenfranchised occupiers of 
the grabbed land are even more immiserated
215
. 
 
Agriculture constitutes a vital part of Cambodia’s economy. For the farmers who rely on 
agriculture for their livelihood, land is necessary for survival. An interviewee expressed that if 
800 families are attached to one piece of land on which their livelihoods depend though self-
sufficient farming, perhaps the company will offer 300 seasonal jobs on the same piece of 
land.
216
 The rest of the people cannot simply cross over from one sector to another. These are 
very poor people, living in rural Cambodia without any form of education. There are no 
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sectors to take these people in. The two largest industries in Cambodia open to people without 
education, the garment sector and the tourist industries, are already saturated.
217
 Regardless, 
these sectors are urban-based meaning that the rural communities would have to move their 
entire families. 
 
It is evident of course that this situation is not sustainable. These people are left with nothing 
left to lose, no property, no money, no jobs, and no food. In Cambodia, these disenfranchised 
people are referred to as “living ghosts.”218 This in turn is leading to more and more clashes 
with the government. The frequency of communities pushing the military away with stick and 
stones to defend their land is becoming much higher. The Cambodian government is in facto 
creating a recipe for social unrest.  
10.2 Land Grabbing – the New Neo-Colonialism? 
 
In the years to come, we will most likely see a surge in land grabbing. Natural resources and 
access to land and water are quickly becoming scarce as the world population continues to 
grow. With global warming flooding and natural disasters are likely to make arable land even 
scarcer. The latest trend and new form of neo-colonialism is richer countries are securing land 
in agroindutries.
219
 Rich governments and corporations are leasing farmland in South-East 
Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa in order to grow food and biofuel, as their climate does not 
allow them to guarantee food security at home.
220
 This trend is expected to accelerate as 
world food and water shortages grow. In addition, the acquisition of land to grow plant-based 
biofuels is expected to grow. This inevitably means that farmers will be losing even more 
land, especially those without title. Well in accordance with the Prime Minister’s plans of 
exporting rice, he stated in 2008 that the Gulf might become Cambodia’s next market for 
rice.
221
 Paradoxically, the Cambodian government, which cannot even offer food security to 
its own people, is offering land to rich countries to produce food for their populations. 
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11. Conclusion  
 
Land disputes should be settled in independent courts and the outcome not dependent on 
influential wealthy connections. Instead of meeting the population’s basic needs such as food 
security, health and education the kleptocratic RGC are attempting to make the highest profit 
in the shortest amount of time. The fear that their land will be taken discourages farmers from 
investing in the land, which in turn does not promote development, but inhibits it. The 
conclusions of the thesis will follow below. 
 
11.1 How is the land law circumvented by the government when divesting 
of already occupied land?  
 
The 2001 Land Law is a thorough, progressive law that if implemented correctly, could 
provide a strong tenure security for the Cambodian people. However, the law is not applied. 
Shamelessly, the government disregards the law by selling, leasing out, and concessioning 
property, regardless of who the rightful owner of the property is. Neither does the RGC in 
reality make any distinction between state public property and state private property. As the 
land registration process is proceeding very slowly, most of the land in Cambodia has not yet 
been titled and it is unclear what land constitutes individual property on one hand, and state 
public and private property on the other. This uncertainty is repeatedly exploited by the 
government when divesting of the land. 
 
Where the land law does not permit certain transactions, the RGC make certain that sub-
decrees are created to justify their doings. Regarding ELCs, these are granted without any 
regard to the environmental and social conditions that are lined up in the sub-decree. 
Moreover, the limit of 10,000 hectares is more often than not exceeded.  
 
From the beginning to the end, the government is not only a passive bystander to the 
violations of law. It is the de facto culprit. As has been described above, not only senators, but 
also their family and friends are large shareholders in the corporations obtaining land. In other 
cases, the shareholders are Oknhas who, because of their large party donations, expect to be 
granted certain benefits and are in addition involved in aid organizations. These join forces 
with national or foreign companies to hide behind shell corporations in order to extralegally 
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purchase or lease already occupied land. Throughout the process, transparency is nonexistent. 
In other words, the government authorities are selling and leasing state land for a bargain 
price, to companies in which they themselves sit as shareholders. 
 
11.2 What possibilities does an individual have of having his case heard and 
fairly tried in the Cambodian court system? 
 
In reality, an individual who has his land taken from him has no fair possibility of having his 
case heard. The holding of the certificate of ownership or possession will strengthen the 
individual’s leverage somewhat in the court room. Nevertheless, the advantage that a 
certificate of ownership offers, acts as more of a deterrent than anything else. However 
influential and powerful a company is, the fact remains that land grabbings are not going 
unnoticed by the NGOs, the Cambodian press, or by the international community. It is 
difficult to argue that a person holding a certificate of ownership and that is occupying the 
property, is not the proper owner. Bad media coverage exerts pressure on the government and 
potentially, in the end, even affects donor aid.  
 
For expressed public interest purposes, the possibility remains to use the expropriation article 
and thus offer proper compensation to the individual. However, most occupiers of land do not 
hold certificates of ownership, making them prime targets for land grabbings. As long as the 
confusion between what constitutes individual property on one hand, and state private and 
public property on the other hand exists, this will function as a loophole for the RGC. 
 
Moreover, an individual with a certificate of ownership or possession will have a stronger 
case in court than an individual without. In reality though, as this thesis has shown, the 
probability that the case will even be heard in court is very small. More often than not, cases 
are rejected, or simply sent back and forth between the courts and the cadastral committee, 
each one claiming lack of jurisdiction. In addition, there is a notable absence of resources 
within the legal system, both with regards to personnel and material. As lawyers and judges 
pay bribes to receive their diplomas, there is a great lack of legal knowledge among these 
professions, which in turn has a negative effect on the rule of law in Cambodia. Consequently, 
the likelihood of receiving a court ruling in one’s favor is minimal. Moreover, this does not in 
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any way guarantee that the ruling will be executed by the police, as they answer directly to the 
government.  
 
The power that the government and Oknhas exert over the judicial system far exceeds any 
sense of duty and justice that the court might possess. The judicial system is plagued by 
corruption and is in no way, shape, or form independent from the executive branch. Ruling 
against a company associated with a government official or an Oknha would be the end of a 
judge’s career and perhaps even more. 
 
Nevertheless, in their defense, culturally, ruling in favor of one party, is not how Cambodians 
view justice. Justice in the Cambodian sense is to reach an agreement and compromise. Had 
these evictions really been necessary for development, the individuals affected would most 
likely have been content with finding solutions that included being offered other property, 
suitable for their needs, or at least being granted fair compensation so that they could find and 
buy new land. However, these land grabbings that may be conducted in the name of 
development, have only one primary purpose: to make the rich richer. 
 
11.3 What should the international community do to aid in strengthening 
the rule of law and tenure security in Cambodia? 
 
The most thorough, well-written legislation in a country in which laws are not abided with is 
pointless. Perhaps it is even worse adopting progressive laws that are not correctly 
implemented, than simply upholding poor laws. As is, the ruling party is keeping the aid 
donors content by drafting and adopting perfectly sound legislation. By focusing on the 
drafting of the law, instead of ensuring the rule of law and actual implementation of this 
legislation, the international donors are doing the Cambodian people a disservice. The 
international donors continue to give large amounts of aid to Cambodia, without using it as 
leverage. They are ignoring the fact that the money does not contribute to the well-being of 
the Cambodian population and that the corrupt government is systematically exploiting the 
international aid. 
 
Unfortunately, there is no interest from the international community to exert pressure on 
Cambodia. Its lack of good governance does not constitute a threat to the outside world, as is 
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the case with Iran or North Korea. Nor are there any economic incentives in compelling   
Cambodia to enforce the rule of law, as there are hardly any investments made in the country 
outside of the speculation market. Resolving the issue of land disputes could possibly 
encourage foreign investment, as this seems to act as a deterrent in the establishment of 
international corporations. Moreover, perhaps there is a fear that connecting conditions to the 
aid will push Cambodia into the arms of China. Already the Chinese and Korean (both North 
and South) influences are strong in Cambodia. While the EU discusses the importance of 
good governance, these Asian countries are building infrastructure in the form of schools, 
hospitals, and government buildings. However, I believe this to be an unfounded fear. The 
RGC and Hun Sen especially, crave respect and attention from the western world and allying 
with China only would not help them achieve this. 
 
The international donor community must keep providing aid to Cambodia but with conditions 
attached to it. There must be a proper evaluation of the de facto results of the projects 
compared to the situation prior to their initiation and not compared to a utopian goal. For 
instance, the LMAP was indeed moving forward and making progress, even though it was 
plagued by corruption. The evaluation should not be made according to how we perceive 
good governance to be carried out in the western world, but adjusted to the current situation in 
Cambodia. With that said, the process of systematic land registration must continue and the 
LMAP must be resurrected. The monetary aid and expertise of the WB and the international 
community are indispensable in working towards the goal of titling the country.  
 
The pressure that the WB attempted to exert on the RGC is noble, especially considering the 
lack of pressure from the rest of the international donor community, who keeps pumping in 
aid. However, one must present the question. Is not a faulty land titling process better than 
none? After all, progress was being made, albeit at a slow pace and at the benevolence of the 
Cambodian government. The land registration process is still proceeding ahead, but now at a 
snail pace. Without the money from the WB, the process will drag on indefinitely, and be 
overseen by no one, permitting the government to proceed in the same manner in which they 
have for years. The thesis has shown that an individual with a title of ownership is more 
protected than one without. Taking land from individuals holding ownership titles registered 
in a central register will attract attention from both the media and NGOs, making land 
grabbing a lot less lucrative affair. Today, 90 per cent of Cambodia is untitled. This leaves a 
countless number of people unprotected and prime targets of land grabbing. Only time will 
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tell how many individuals that will keep losing their land. Meanwhile, the government will be 
making enormous profits off the sale of the century.  
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Supplement A 
 
 
The Prime Minister’s office building in Phnom Penh 
 
 
 
Ministry of Land Management, Urban Planning and Construction in Phnom Penh 
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The Anti-Corruption Institution in Phnom Penh 
 
The Anti-Corruption Institution’s Box of Complaints 
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Construction of high-rise buildings in central Phnom Penh 
 
Community Meeting to save the Prey Land Forest at the Cambodian Red Cross, Phnom Penh 
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A Cambodian rice farmer just outside of Siem Reap in September, 2010 
 
 
Torture Chamber in Tuol Sleng Prison, Phnom Penh 
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Little boy playing at the Cambodian Genocide Museum in Siem Reap 
 
Curious children in the Cambodian countryside 
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